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Defamation by Docudrama: Protecting
Reputations from Derogatory Speculation
Megan Moshayedit
Defamation law aims to protect reputations against speech of
low constitutional value. When a speaker willfully misrepresents
false derogatory statements as fact,1 defamation law holds her lia-
ble to anyone whose reputation her speech has harmed because the
First Amendment does not protect such false and malicious
speech. But when a speaker willfully misrepresents derogatory
speculation2 as fact, defamation law does not recognize any result-
ing reputational harm. Although in the latter case the plaintiff
might fail to demonstrate that the discreditable statements are
false, the plaintiff might nevertheless be able to establish that the
speaker deliberately misrepresented the level of her certainty. And
the uncertainty that accompanies speculation creates a significant
probability that the statement is actually false. Nevertheless,
courts afford full constitutional protection to such highly suspect
and malicious speech.
Derogatory speculation presents a significant threat to reputa-
tional interests particularly because it appears often in
docudramas,3  an increasingly popular' form of storytelling.
t A.B. 1990, Harvard University; J.D. Candidate 1995, University of Chicago.
This Comment uses "fact" to denote "something that has been objectively verified."
The American Heritage Dictionary 484 (Houghton Mifflin Co., 2d college ed 1985).
' "Speculation" here refers to statements based on evidence insufficient to qualify as
facts.
S "The docudrama is a dramatization of an historical event or [the] lives of real people
... [that] utilize[s] simulated dialogue, composite characters, and a telescoping of events
occurring over a period into a composite scene or scenes." Davis v Costa-Gavras, 654 F
Supp 653, 658 (S D NY .1987).
One writer has noted:
The three traditional networks rely increasingly on . . . high-profile, true events
•.. to anchor their movie lineups. . . . "Murders, rapes, kidnaps and batterings
are the rule of thumb for the traditional networks in movies and mini-series," says
the former ABC president Fred Pierce, now a producer, "and the source materials
are now easier to come by. Access to real-life situations has become quicker be-
cause of the explosion of magazine shows and local newscasts and videocams and
satellite feeds. The stories are more available."
Jeff Silverman, Murder, Mayhem Stalk TV: True tabloid tales! Television in frenzy over
sordid real-life sagas, NY Times 2-1, 2-28 (Nov 22, 1992).
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Docudramas weave fact with fiction to create a captivating story:
they often change artistically unsatisfactory facts and fabricate un-
available facts.' When docudrama producers believe that the sub-
ject of their speculation will be unable to prove their statements
false, the producers often substantially exaggerate their certainty
of disreputable claims because the current law of defamation fails
to remedy the harm that such speculation inflicts upon an individ-
ual's reputation.
Part I of this Comment explains that while the current law of
defamation privileges speculation on minor issues for the compel-
ling reason that such statements cannot harm reputations, the law
tends to protect derogatory speculation only because the subject of
the speculation usually cannot establish that the speculative state-
ments are false. Part II argues that although defamation plaintiffs
often cannot prove a speculative claim false, derogatory specula-
tion on significant issues that appears as fact often is false and can
harm reputations. Part III proposes that the law hold speakers lia-
ble for defamation when they willfully present significant deroga-
tory speculation as fact.
I. CURRENT DEFAMATION LAW
The law of defamation attempts to balance the constitutional
right to free speech against the common law interest in personal
reputation.7 It strikes a poor balance, though, in the realm of spec-
ulation, where it often denies recovery to plaintiffs because they
cannot prove that the derogatory statement is false.
A. The Inadequate Remedy against Derogatory Speculation
The Supreme Court reversed the common law presumption for
protecting reputational interests over the freedom to engage in de-
Unlike a documentary, which "maintains strict fidelity to fact," a docudrama "is a
creative interpretation of reality." Davis, 654 F Supp at 658.
1 Jim Manos, a docudrama producer, extols the virtues of buying the rights to a story:
"[The rights and the insights into the story gained through them] give an opportunity to
begin telling the story. If you're careful and legally within your bounds, you can then write
what you want to write." Jim Manos, quoted in Silverman, NY Times at 2-29 (cited in note
4) (emphasis added). What Mr. Manos implies is correct: under current law, where there are
holes in the story, a docudrama producer may fill them with any plausible version of the
facts.
W. Page Keeton, ed, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 113 at 804 (West
Publishing Co., 5th ed 1984).
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famatory speech.' In New York Times Co. v Sullivan,9 the Court
decided that in order to recover for reputational harm, a public
figure' O defamation plaintiff must demonstrate, by a preponder-
ance of evidence, that the allegedly defamatory statement was
false, and, by clear and convincing proof, that the defendant acted
with "actual malice"-she either knew that the statement was false
or recklessly disregarded the truth." Although private defamation
plaintiffs enjoy a more lenient proof of fault standard, 2 they too
must prove falsity in order to prevail.'8
The current allocation to plaintiffs of the burden of proving
falsity makes it particularly difficult for a plaintiff to recover
against a speaker who has harmed her reputation by presenting
discreditable speculation as fact. Consider, for example, a case in
which the plaintiff establishes that the defendant presented a cer-
tain statement as fact although the defendant had no way of know-
ing the truth. The plaintiff has thus demonstrated that the defend-
ant must have been speculating. If the defendant has alleged
plausible fact scenarios, however, the plaintiff often cannot prove
that the scenarios are false."' Thus, even where a speaker could not
6 Prosser and Keeton explains that "[t]he established common law attempted to ac-
commodate these competing values by the general notion that the defendant published at
his peril unless he could prove that the statement was either true or that it was made on a
privileged occasion." Id (citation omitted).
9 376 US 254 (1964).
10 In New York Times, the Court articulated the standard for defamation of a public
official. Id at 279-80. In 1967, the Supreme Court extended the New York Times standard to
"public figures." Curtis Publishing Co. v Butts, 388 US 130, 155 (1967).
" 376 US at 279-80. The New York Times standard also requires the plaintiff to prove,
by a preponderance of evidence, that the statement was of and concerning the plaintiff and
that the statement's content defamed the plaintiff's reputation. Id. See also Harte-Hanks
Communications, Inc. v Connaughton, 491 US 657 (1989); R. Bruce Rich and Livia D. Bril-
liant, Defamation-In-Fiction: The Limited Viability of Alternative Causes of Action, 52
Brooklyn L Rev 1, 5 (1986).
.1 States may set their own standards for defamation of private individuals so long as
the standards do not impose liability without fault or without requiring a showing of sub-
stantial danger to the individual's reputation. Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc., 418 US 323, 347-
48 (1974).
13 Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v Hepps, 475 US 767, 776-77 (1986).
"4 Often, when the speaker cannot know the truth, the plaintiff cannot establish the
truth. Consider, for example, the following situations in which a speaker might speculate
because she cannot discover the truth: (1) The speaker cannot know the truth when she
speculates about a "private" fact accessible only to a few people, none of whom has con-
veyed it to the plaintiff. Even if the plaintiff is one of those privy to the truth, she might
have only her word with which to establish the truth to the factfinder. The factfinder is
especially likely to be skeptical when different parties privy to the truth give conflicting
testimony. (2) The speaker cannot know the truth when no reliable record or witness exists.
In such cases, the plaintiff is not only unable to prove that the defendant's version of the
facts is false, but she is also unable to know the truth herself.
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have known the truth, courts will often protect her discreditable
speculations.
Street v National Broadcasting Co.15 illustrates how current
defamation law protects such derogatory speculative statements. In
Street, a defamation suit, the Sixth Circuit observed that where
the speaker cannot know the truth, the plaintiff cannot prove fal-
sity and consequently cannot prevail." The court thus recognized
that defamation law does not necessarily hold a speaker liable for
the act of deliberately presenting discreditable speculation as
fact.17
In Street, Victoria Price Street sued NBC for defaming her in
a docudrama. NBC's docudrama, Judge Horton and the Scott-
sboro Boys ("Scottsboro Boys"), depicted a 1931 Alabama trial in
which Street alleged that Haywood Patterson raped her.' In the
rape trial, the jury had found Patterson guilty and sentenced him
to death, but the presiding judge, James E. Horton, had found the
evidence insufficient and reversed the verdict.'9 The NBC
docudrama presented Judge Horton's view of the trial and the
events at issue:20 it portrayed Victoria Street as "a-perjurer, a wo-
man of bad character, a woman who falsely accused the Scottsboro
boys of rape knowing that the result would likely be the electric
chair." 2'
At trial, Victoria Street demonstrated that NBC presented de-
rogatory speculations about her as fact. First, the Street court re-
fused to find that NBC either reported or knew the truth about
the alleged rapes. The court rejected NBC's defense of truth,
which NBC had rested on its claim that Scottsboro Boys neutrally
reported a judicial proceeding. The court decided that the
docudrama did not report Patterson's trial fairly.2 Moreover, the
court observed that even an accurate report would not have suf-
ficed for NBC to claim to know the truth because "U]udicial pro-
ceedings resolve disputes, but they do not establish the truth for
all time."2 Second, the Sixth Circuit found that NBC did not pre-
" 645 F2d 1227 (6th Cir 1981).
" Id at 1236-37. This Comment, however, recognizes that a plaintiff sometimes may
know the truth and be able to satisfy the falsity requirement.
" The plaintiff would prevail only if she can prove that the speculation is false. Id.
8 Id at 1229-30. Street also implicated eight other African-Americans.
" Judge Horton's unreported opinion was reprinted by the Sixth Circuit in Street. See
645 F2d at 1237.
"0 Id at 1233.
" Id at 1232.
" Id.
" 645 F2d at 1233.
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sent the derogatory speculations about Victoria Street as its or
Judge Horton's opinion of her: "The characterization [was] ex-
pressed as concrete fact."24 Thus the court determined that NBC
had not shown that it had any way of knowing the truth of the
derogatory claims that it presented as facts.
Nonetheless, NBC prevailed because Victoria Street could not
prove that the disreputable claims made in the docudrama were
false. In so holding, the court noted that the law of defamation
makes it virtually impossible for a plaintiff to prevail against a de-
fendant who had no way of knowing the truth but speculated what
it might be: "[w]hen the truth is unknowable," falsity, and hence
defamation, cannot be proven."26
As Street exemplifies, the current doctrine suggests that a
speaker is liable for a defamatory speculation only if she proposes
a version of the truth so implausible that the plaintiff can prove
her statement false.17 But as for the vast array of plausible defam-
atory speculations that a plaintiff cannot prove false, the current
doctrine does not recognize any resulting defamatory harm.
B. The Privilege for Minor Speculation
In Masson v New Yorker Magazine, Inc.,2 8 the Supreme Court
suggested that the First Amendment protects a speaker who cre-
atively reconstructs lost conversations only when the speaker has
notified his audience that "the quotations should not be inter-
24 Id.
"6 The truth is unknowable when "the truth is uncertain and ...undiscoverable
through further investigation." Id at 1237.
26 Id at 1250 (Peck dissenting) (citation omitted). The dissent agreed with the majority
that when the truth is unknowable to the defendant, the plaintiff will not be able to prove
her statement false. This is often the case. See note 14.
2 But see Koch v Goldway, 607 F Supp 223 (C D Cal 1984), aff'd, 817 F2d 507 (9th Cir
1987). In Koch, the defendant said of his opponent during a political campaign, "There was
a well-known Nazi criminal named Ilse Koch during World War II. Like Hitler, Ilse Koch
was never found. Is this the same Ilse Koch? Who knows?" 607 F Supp at 224. The truth of
that implication was, at best, unknowable to the defendant, yet the plaintiff was able to
prove that the implication was false because her age rendered implausible any allegation
that she was a Nazi war criminal. Id at 225-26. Moreover, the court noted the unlikelihood
that such a criminal would enter politics using her original name. Id at 226. Nevertheless,
the court found that the statement was not defamatory because no one could reasonably
understand it to describe actual facts about the plaintiff. Id.
As this case demonstrates, defamation plaintiffs seem to be in a "Catch-22" situation: if
a defamatory speculation is plausible, a plaintiff often cannot prove it false, and thus the
claim is not actionable; yet if the speculative statement is implausible, and thus the plaintiff
can prove it false, the court will likewise find that the claim is not actionable because the
audience cannot reasonably understand it to describe facts about the plaintiff.
28 111 S Ct 2419 (1991).
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preted as the actual statements of the [person] to whom they are
attributed. 2 9 Perhaps the reason for this protection is that these
speakers are filling in minor, rather than significant, blanks. Courts
justifiably privilege speculation about minor, inconsequential is-
sues because such statements do not harm reputations. °
A New York district court, for example, concluded that the
First Amendment protects simulated dialogue in docudramas 1
when it does not "distort the fundamental story being told. 3 2
Such simulated dialogue provides specific expression to an ex-
change that either actually occurred, or completely comports with
the known facts and whose occurrence or nonoccurrence has no
significant implications. Under this privilege, speakers can specu-
late freely only about relatively insignificant details which cannot
cause reputational harm and thus do not justify a restriction on
free speech.33
Under this privilege that allows speakers to recreate insignifi-
cant data to comport with significant facts, the audience has little,
if any, interest in notification. In Galloway v Federal Communica-
tions Commission,4 for example, the D.C. Circuit held that the
First Amendment protects the FCC policy that reporters may
stage 5 "minor or incidental aspect[s] of [a] news report,"3 6 al-
though the FCC does not require broadcasters to notify their audi-
ences of the staging. As with dialogue simulation, therefore, the
First Amendment privileges reputationally harmless staged news-
casts that are faithful to the significant facts.
29 Id at 2431.
30 "[A] communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as
to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating
or dealing with him." Keeton, ed, Prosser and Keeton ,on the Law of Torts §111 at 774
(cited in note 7). Presumably, no trifling matter could affect reputation in this way.
11 Docudrama producers simulate dialogue either because they do not know which
words were actually spoken or for purely artistic reasons. Davis, 654 F Supp at 658.
32 Id.
3 A similar situation arises in most works that "recreat[e] conversations from memory,
not from recordings .... " Masson, 111 S Ct at 2431.
34 778 F2d 16 (DC Cir 1985).
35 In a staged newsreport, reporters "set up" an event, but film and present it as if the
event occurred independently of the news media.
8 Galloway, 778 F2d at 20. The Galloway decision thus permits news broadcasters to
stage events for purely technical reasons: reporters may, for example, reshoot film of an
interviewer acting out his questions because the camera was focused on the interviewee dur-
ing the actual interview. Id at 20 n 3. But Galloway also allows reporters to stage an event
when they do not know exactly how an event occurred, so long as the staging does not affect
the basic accuracy of the events reported. Reporters may, for example, upon seeing a broken
store window after a riot, ask one of the rioters to throw a brick through the window in
order to capture the act on film. Id at 20.
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II. THE DEFAMATORY EFFECT OF SIGNIFICANT DEROGATORY
SPECULATION THAT APPEARS AS FACT
Defamation law attempts to protect individuals from speakers
who harm their reputations by alleging significant and negative
false facts about them. Defamation law therefore rightly privileges
speculation about minor issues, as well as statements presented as
subjective opinion." Neither minor speculation nor subjective
opinion can significantly harm reputational interests.
However, by protecting speculation about even significant
facts, defamation law incompletely protects individuals from
reputational harm. A speaker who claims to know something sig-
nificantly negative about another person can harm that person's
reputation; if that speaker is not as certain about the facts as she
claims to be, she very likely got them wrong and misrepresented
that person. Defamation law should remedy any reputational harm
that a speaker causes by derogatorily speculating about significant
matters.
A. Derogatory Speculation on Significant Issues: The Threat to
Reputation
Because even negative statements about minor issues cannot
defame 8 defamation law justifiably privileges speculation on in-
significant details. When speculative statements remain faithful to
the significant facts, the public interest in free speech far out-
weighs the minimal, if any, damage to reputation. The Supreme
Court has endorsed this balance of interests: "The common law of
libel overlooks minor inaccuracies and concentrates upon substan-
tial truth. '39
Negative statements about significant issues, however, can de-
fame. NBC's docudrama, Scottsboro Boys, for example, did not
limit its "creativity" to minor matters: it speculated whether Vic-
toria Street was raped, whether she recalled the rape and the rap-
ist(s), and whether she reported her recollections honestly at
trial.'0 Although NBC did not know the answers to these impor-
"' According to the Ninth Circuit, opinions are "[sitatements not themselves factual,
and which do not suggest that a conclusion is being drawn from facts not disclosed in the
statement .... " Koch v Goldway, 817 F2d at 509. See also Milkovich v Lorain Journal
Co., 497 US 1, 17-18 (1990).
SS See note 30.
" Masson, 111 S Ct at 2433. This is a statement of the de minimis doctrine as applied
to the law of libel.
40 Street, 645 F2d at 1232.
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tant questions, it nevertheless "filled in the blanks" with specula-
tions that harmed Victoria Street's reputation."' As Street demon-
strates, speculation about significant issues has the potential to
harm reputational interests.
B. Significant Derogatory Speculation That Appears as Fact: The
Harm to Reputation
Insofar as plaintiffs often cannot prove speculative statements
false, speculation resembles opinion, which defamation law privi-
leges. But defamation law does not privilege opinion because plain-
tiffs cannot prove it false.42 Rather, defamation law privileges opin-
ion because derogatory statements of opinion, as opposed to
derogatory statements of fact, do not unjustly harm reputations.
When a speaker makes a statement, "X," and presents it as
her opinion, she communicates to the audience that "I believe or
feel that 'X' is true." Because she qualifies her statement as a
description of her own subjective state, without making a claim
about the objective state of anyone else's existence, she cannot
have misrepresented anyone else:'3 opinion "cannot 'reasonably
[be] interpreted as stating actual facts' about an individual.""" Jus-
tifiably, the law does not hold that speaker liable for defamation.45
41 If one defames a woman by asserting that she has been raped, Youssoupoff v Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, 1934, 50 TLR 581, 51 LQ Rev 281, then it must be the case that
one defames her by asserting that she falsely accused someone of rape. The latter act dis-
graces the woman's character more, if the former does at all. Keeton, ed, Prosser and Kee-
ton on the Law of Torts § 111 at 773 (cited in note 7).
4" It is virtually impossible to contradict what a person says she believes.
43 Assume C has expressed an opinion about B. If C's stated opinion is unwarranted or
insincere, C has committed an injustice against B; the law, however, does not recognize that
injustice because C's right to express himself freely outweighs B's interest in being fairly
spoken of by C. No reasonable person, A, would lower his esteem for B on the basis of C's
opinion where that opinion does not imply any discreditable facts about B. If A lowers his
regard for B purely because of his faith in C's opinion, and without evaluating any facts for
himself, then A has acted unreasonably and committed an additional injustice against B.
But C has only defamed B if he causes reasonable people to lower their regard for B.
4 Milkovich, 497 US at 20, citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v Falwell, 485 US 46, 50
(1988).
48 Alternatively:
[I]t can be said that the state of a person's mind is a fact and if a publisher
misrepresents his state of mind, he misrepresents a fact even though it is only an
opinion. However, it would not seem to be practical or in the interests of free
speech to make the kind of inquiries that are necessary to ascertain the precise
meaning . . . of. . .opinions ...in order to ascertain falsity and dishonesty in
the expression of the opinion.
Keeton, ed, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 114 at 814 (cited in note 7).
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On the other hand, when a speaker makes a discreditable
statement, "X," about the plaintiff and presents it as a fact, she
communicates to the audience that "I know for a fact that 'X' is
true." The speaker thus claims that "X" has met the generally ac-
cepted epistemological level of certainty required for a statement
to qualify as a fact. Because this communication purports to de-
scribe not the speaker's subjective evaluation, but the objective
state of the plaintiff's existence, it might cause reasonable people
to alter their beliefs about what facts are objectively true about the
plaintiff, and perhaps to lower their regard for her.
Even when a speaker purports to state an opinion, a defama-
tion plaintiff may prevail if the audience can reasonably interpret
the speaker to be stating or implying false assertions of fact." As
with opinion and all other types of statements, derogatory specula-
tion that appears as fact can harm the subject's reputation by
causing reasonable people to lower their regard for the subject.
Therefore, derogatory speculation, when it is presented as fact,
should not be protected by the First Amendment.
C. Speculation's High Likelihood of Falsity
Defamation plaintiffs, when they can prove that the speaker
was speculating, should be able to bypass the falsity requirement
because proof that the speaker was speculating strongly tends to
prove the falsity of her statements. Speakers often speculate when
they have no compelling reason to believe one fact pattern over
another. For example, in Street, the speaker could equally have
believed any one of three possible scenarios: (1) the defendants
raped Victoria Street, (2) they did not rape her and she framed
them, or (3) someone else raped her but she believes the defend-
ants did. In such cases, there is a high probability that the speaker
will make an incorrect guess.
Therefore, when a speaker speculates that "X" is true, "X"9 is
very likely false. If "X" is a significant derogatory claim, it puts
the subject's reputation at risk. And if the speaker claims to know
"X" for a fact, reasonable people could accept "X" as true. When
all of these conditions hold, the speaker has very likely unfairly
harmed her subject's reputation. Nevertheless, defamation law ef-
fectively privileges significant derogatory speculation that a
40 Milkovich, 497 US at 18-19. See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566, comments
a-b at 170-72 (1977).
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speaker presents as fact because courts unjustifiably presume that
such statements are true.
III. A DEFAMATION DOCTRINE THAT IMPOSES LIABILITY FOR
SPECULATION
Under the Constitution, the Supreme Court generally protects
speech interests at the expense of reputational interests. Accord-
ingly, the Court presumes that discreditable statements are true,
and thus requires that a defamation plaintiff prove that the state-
ments are false. Because speculation is highly likely4 7 to communi-
cate false information, however, the Court should not require a
defamation plaintiff to prove a statement false when the plaintiff
can prove that the defendant was speculating. By encouraging
speakers to inform their audience of the level of certainty with
which they speak, the Court could better protect reputational in-
terests without limiting speech in any significant sense.
A. The Constitutionality of the Proposed Doctrine
In order to encourage a free exchange of ideas, the Supreme
Court presumes that discreditable statements are true.48 In Phila-
delphia Newspapers, Inc. v Hepps 9 the Court recognized that be-
cause defamation plaintiffs bear the burden of proving falsity, they
cannot prevail when neither the plaintiff nor the defendant can
prove the derogatory statement true or false.50 The Court argued
that the plaintiff must prove falsity even in those situations be-
cause the Constitution requires the Court to tip the balance in
favor of protecting speech in cases where the statement is actually
true, even though the Court thereby cannot protect reputations in
cases where the statement is actually false."
" From the perspective of an individual who knows that statement A is speculative but
knows nothing about statement B, A is more likely than B to be false.
4' The Supreme Court has explained:
To ensure that true speech on matters of public concern is not deterred, we hold
that the common-law presumption that defamatory speech is false cannot stand
when a plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant for speech of public
concern.
Hepps, 475 US at 776-77.
" Id at 767.
'0 Id at 778.
" The Hepps Court noted:
Under a rule forcing the plaintiff to bear the burden of showing falsity, there will
be some cases in which plaintiffs cannot meet their burden despite the fact that
the speech is in fact false. . . . Similarly, under an alternative rule placing the
burden of showing truth on defendants, there would be some cases in which de-
[1993:
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In reaching this decision, however, the Hepps Court failed to
consider the subclass of cases in which the plaintiff cannot prove
that the statement is false, but can prove that the defendant was
speculating. 52 Because speculation is so often false, the Court
should not presume that discreditable speculation is true. The
Court could better protect reputations without shifting the burden
of proving truth to defendants" if it allowed defamation plaintiffs
to prove that the discreditable statement was either false or
speculative.
B. Speakers' Incentive to Disclose Their Certainty
The proposed law would encourage speakers to notify their
audiences when they do not know the truth. Speakers who inform
their audiences that they are speculating make only one factual as-
sertion: "I guess that 'X' is true." With such a disclaimer, specula-
tion would rightfully gain the same privilege that the First Amend-
ment affords to opinion because, like opinion, its expressly
subjective nature limits the reputational harm it can inflict.
A disclaimer ideally suited to a speculative work accompanies
Meyer Levin's novel Compulsion. The novel presents the private
thoughts and emotions of two convicted murderers, Nathan F. Le-
opold, Jr. and Richard Loeb-information to which Levin had no
access. Levin uses a disclaimer to notify his audience that he is
speculating: "Though the action is taken from reality, it must be
recognized that thoughts and emotions described in the characters
come from within the author, as he imagines them to belong to the
personages in the case he has chosen.''54
fendants could not bear their burden despite the fact that the speech is in fact
true.
Id at 776.
" The Court referred to the situation in which a plaintiff cannot prove a statement
false as where the speech is "unknowably true or false" and where "the fact finding process
will be unable to resolve conclusively whether the speech is true or false." Hepps, 475 US at
776. This Comment notes that a plaintiff may be unable to prove that a statement is false
but nevertheless be able to prove that the defendant did not know whether his own state-
ment was true or false. The plaintiff might be able to demonstrate, for example, that the
defendant must have been speculating because the defendant could not have known the
truth. See Part I(A).
" But defendants would retain the defense of truth: a defendant would escape liability
if she could prove, after the fact, that although her speculation harmed the plaintiff's repu-
tation, it did not do so unfairly because the claim happened to be true and thus described
the plaintiff accurately. This defense deters the abuse of this doctrine by those plaintiffs
who know that the statement was true, yet can prove that the defendant was speculating.
" Leopold v Levin, 45 Ill 2d 434, 437, 259 NE2d 250 (1970).
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Under the proposed doctrine, Levin's disclaimer would immu-
nize his work from any charge of defamation because the dis-
claimer ensures that the novel, like statements of opinion, cannot
"reasonably [be] interpreted" as stating or implying55 discreditable
facts about someone. In fact, Leopold did sue Levin for defamation
and lost.5 6 As the Leopold court noted, "the . . .novel, while 'sug-
gested' by the crime of the plaintiff, [was] evidently fictional and
dramatized material[ I and [it was] not represented to be other-
wise."'5 7 Levin thus used a disclaimer to accurately represent his
level of certainty.
By informing the audience that the speaker is not certain of
what she has said, a disclaimer precludes any undue reputational
harm to the subject: a reasonable audience will discount any un-
flattering speculations about the subject and thus formulate a fair
opinion of her.58 Furthermore, disclaimers protect and enhance
speech. First, although it might be a slight burden to add a dis-
claimer to a statement, the disclaimer does not censor the sub-
stance of the speech, which is still heard in full by the audience.
Second, disclaimers raise the general level of a discussion by mak-
ing communication more accurate: the audience knows not only
what a speaker has to say, but also her level of certainty. Thus, the
audience will be less likely to act with unwarranted assurance of a
statement's truth. Finally, disclaimers focus attention on igno-
rance, thereby encouraging people more knowledgeable about a
subject to bring more information to light, and generally sparking
interest and further research in pursuit of the truth.
C. Applying the Proposed Defamation Doctrine
In order to avoid overburdening speakers and thus chilling
speech, courts must implement the proposed defamation doctrine
cautiously. The limiting principles that guide courts in applying
the current doctrine can also help them to apply the proposed doc-
trine in a manner that protects reputations without infringing
upon the right to free speech.
Milkovich, 497 US at 20.
56 Leopold, 45 I1 2d at 434.
57 Id at 445 (emphasis added).
" Of course, not all audiences are reasonable. At a minimum, however, a disclaimer
allows the thoughtful and conscientious to assess speech accurately.
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1. Listeners must understand the speculation as fact.
In order to find a speaker liable for defamation under current
law, a court must find that the statement is false. But when com-
mon sense or general knowledge indicates that a statement is false,
courts will not hold the speaker liable for defamation because the
speaker will not have actually caused a reasonable audience to be-
lieve a defamatory statement. 9 Consequently, the subject of the
statement will suffer no significant reputational harm that could
justify a restriction on free speech. Correspondingly under the new
doctrine, courts should not hold a speaker liable for harming repu-
tation through speculation unless the speaker presents the specula-
tion as fact. But when a reasonable audience generally knows that
a statement is speculative, the speaker cannot have misled them
into taking the derogatory statement as fact. Therefore, the subject
of such speculation is not at risk of unfair reputational harm that
could justify a restraint of speech.
Consider, for example, the 1991 movie JFK. Most of the
American public realizes that the events surrounding John F. Ken-.
nedy's assassination were never fully discovered and publicized.
Therefore, although the movie presents one version of the story
authoritatively, the audience knows that it is speculative.6 0 As with
opinion and clearly false statements, no reasonable person could
misinterpret such statements as fact. Therefore, defamation law
should privilege obviously speculative speech.
2. The speaker must be subjectively aware that he is
speculating.
Fault requirements limit defamation law's restrictions on
speech by holding speakers not to the objective standard of truth
but to the subjective standard of honesty. The Supreme Court has
rejected the objective "reasonable person" standard, which holds
that a speaker acted with actual malice if a "reasonably prudent
man" would have done more investigation before publicizing the
" Defamation requires that a third party have "understood" the communication as dis-
creditable. Keeton, ed, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 113 at 798 (cited in note
7).
"0 The movie Malcolm X similarly involves speculation concerning Malcolm X's mur-
der. Vincent Canby, "Malcolm X," as Complex as Its Subject, NY Times Bi (Nov 18,
1992). However, it is likely that fewer people understand Malcolm X as speculation because
the controversy surrounding Malcolm X's assassination has not received as much publicity
as that surrounding Kennedy's assassination. Therefore, unlike with JFK, the proposed doc-
trine would require a disclaimer for Malcolm X if its theory of Malcolm X's death, when
taken as fact, is discreditable to a plaintiff.
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statements. 1 The Court has instead adopted the subjective "actual
malice" test, which requires the plaintiff to prove that the defend-
ant made the false derogatory statement "with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not. '62 A speaker has acted with "reckless disregard" if she "in
fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of [her]
publication. '"6"
This subjective standard deters only those speakers who know
or strongly suspect that they are disseminating false information.
The Supreme Court does not seek to protect such speech under
the First Amendment because "[tihere is no constitutional value in
false statements of fact."64 The law does not more broadly prohibit
all false statements of fact because such a rule would cast too wide
a net, "capturing" and thereby deterring speakers who do not in-
tend to speak falsely. 5
The proposed doctrine mimics the current doctrine's subjec-
tive standard: it finds liability for discreditable speculation only if
the speaker in fact either knew or seriously suspected that her cer-
tainty regarding the truth of her statement did not meet the stan-
dard for factual knowledge. Thus, the rule deters only those speak-
ers who were aware that they were misrepresenting their degree of
certainty. The proposed law would therefore protect speakers who
honestly believe in the truth of their claims even if their state-
ments were actually speculative. 6
O, St. Amant v Thompson, 390 US 727, 731 (1968).
New York Times, 376 US at 280.
OS St. Amant, 390 US at 731 (emphasis added). Because the Constitution values free
speech, the factfinder should presume the speaker's honesty and find fault only when objec-
tive circumstantial evidence strongly indicates the speaker's bad faith. In St. Amant, the
Supreme Court compiled some specific tests that a factfinder can use to draw reliable con-
clusions regarding a speaker's state of mind.
64 Gertz, 418 US at 340.
"' According to the Supreme Court, "[clalculated falsehood falls into that class of utter-
ances which 'are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly out-
weighed by the social interest in order and morality ... ' Garrison v Louisiana, 379 US
64, 75 (1964), quoting Chaplinsky v New Hampshire, 315 US 568, 572 (1942). But the Su-
preme Court has also acknowledged that "to insure the ascertainment and publication of
the truth about public affairs, it is essential that the First Amendment protect some errone-
ous publications as well as true ones." St. Amant, 390 US at 731. Even harmful statements
that are false assertions of fact "contribute to the free interchange of ideas and the ascer-
tainment of truth" when the speaker "honestly believe[s]" her claims. Garrison, 379 US at
73.
66 These are speakers who, by a "reasonable speaker" standard, did not have the cer-
tainty that they projected, but subjectively believed they did.
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CONCLUSION
Persons who willfully present derogatory speculation as fact
know that there is a high probability that they have guessed
wrongly. Speakers could avoid this serious risk of defamation at
the minimal cost of disclosing their own ignorance. When a defa-
mation plaintiff can demonstrate that a speaker has behaved so
irresponsibly, the law should recognize that the statement was
more likely than not false, and therefore not require the plaintiff to
prove the falsity of the statement. Otherwise, given the private na-
ture of most topics of speculation, plaintiffs will often have little
evidence with which to convince a factfinder of the falsity of a
claim that derides their character. The law can protect free speech
without stacking the deck against reputational interests in this
manner.
This Comment suggests that we reconsider why defamation
plaintiffs must always prove falsity. The Constitution might re-
quire no more than that the plaintiff demonstrate a high
probability that the statement is false and that the defendant con-
cealed that probability in bad faith. Accordingly, defamation law
could deter speakers from willfully exaggerating the reliability of
their derogatory statements at other people's risk and force them
to internalize the risk of error by acknowledging their own uncer-
tainty. Audiences that learn the epistemological status of deroga-
tory claims can assess characters more fairly. By restricting the
freedom to speak irresponsibly about someone else-a questiona-
ble free speech interest-this approach would better protect legiti-
mate reputational interests.
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